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Defendant Byron Davies, hereinafter referred to as
~~ r. DaviP~, agrees \vith thP statement of facts contained
in plaintiffs' brief but notes certain additions thereto.
~Ir. Davil's' rlailn for occupational disease, dated
~larch S, 1962, \vas filed "Tith the Industrial Comn:P.ssion
on .A.pril 9, lDti~.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
BYRON DAVIES FILED HIS CLAIM FOR TOTAL DISABILITY RESULTING FROM AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
WITH!~ THE TIME REQUIRED BY SECTION 35-2-48(a)
tCA 1953.
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'The difficulty defendants see with plaintiffs' position is an unwillingness to differentiate bet\\reen symptoms of silicosis and disability due to silicosis. '"" e think
it only fair to state that those employed in the mining
industry are well aware that continuous exposure to
harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust will cause
silicosis.
The Legislature has seen fit, however. to award
compensation only for disability, not the symptoms.
Section 35-2-13 UCA 1953 is quoted in part:
"35-2-13. EMPLO·YER LIABILITY FOR
COMPENSATION CONDITIONS WHEN
NO PAYMENT TO BE PAID.- (a) There is
imposed upon every employer a liability for the
payment of compensation to every employee who
becomes totally disabled by reason of an occupational disease subject to the following conditions:
"(1) No compensation shall be paid when
the last day of injurious exposure of the employee
to the hazards of said occupational disease shall
have occurred prior to the effective date of this
act.
" (3) No compensation shall be paid in case
of silicosis unless during the fifteen years immediately preceding the disablement, the injured
employee shall have been exposed to harmful
quantities of silicon dioxide (Si02) dust for a
total period of not less than five years in this state
and unless total disability results within: (a) two
years in case of silicosis not complicated by act~ve
tuberculosis, . . from the last day upon wh1ch
the employee actually worked for the employer
against whom compensation is claimed." (Emphasis added)
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Since Mr. Davies last actually worked for American
Mud & ChPntieal Contpany through December 31, 1960,

in ordPr to have cause of action his total disability must
rP~Ult \rithin t\\·o yPars of that date, or December 30,
1962, unless complicated by tuberculosis, when total
disability must result within five years.
It is true that an employee rnust file his clairn within
the time provided in 35-2-13 ( 4), UCA 1953, which section
is as follows :
H (

4) No claim shall be maintained nor com-

pensation paid unless the claim has been filed
with the commission in writing within the time
fixed by the appropriate subdivision of ~Section
35-2-48."
SPetion 35-2-48 UCA 1953 provides:
"The right to compensation under this act
for disability or death from an occupational disease shall be forever barred unless written claim
is filed with the commission within the time as in
this section hereinafter provided :
''(a) If the claim is made by an empl9yee and
based upon silicosis it must be filed within one
year after the cause of action arises." ·
The question is, when did Mr. Davies' claim for
total disability arise1 It is readily apparent that under
a fair interpretation of the foregoing provisions, it is
possible that an employee such as Mr. Davies could:
(1) terminate his employment as of December 31, 1960;
(2) become totally disabled on December 30, 1962; (3)
file his claim on December 29, 1963 ; and still have a valid
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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claim against the "employer in \\Those e1nploy1uent the
employee was last exposed to harmful quantities of
silicon dioxide (Si02) dust during a period of thirty
days or more after the effective date of this aet."
35~2-14 UCA 1953.
Was Mr. Davies totally disabled fro1n silicosis 'vhen
examined by Dr. J. D. Mortensen on June 13, 1960?
Dr. M.ortensen's conclusions (R-127, 128) are as follows:

"Q. All right. Doctor, I may have interrupted your train of thought, but let me ask you what
was your final diagnosis as a result of the hospitilization tests~ Or did you 1nake any further
tests, or examinations~
"A. No. I just concluded - put all this together and made conclusions - and \vrote a letter
to Dr. Masin summarizing my findings and conclusions, and talked with Mr. Davies and reported
to him my findings and conclusions. I felt that
this man - We had positive evidence that he had
advanced silicosis, and that he also had diffuse
bronchitis. I felt that his pttlmonary function test
had indicated his silicosis was not at that time
disabling, but that he was limited in activity
because of bronchitis. (E.mphasis ours.) I prescribed inhalations of nebuperal ( ~) and neomycin, asked him to take antibiotics for his bronchitis, reassured him about the absence of tu~or
or tuberculosis or other infections, and asked hun
to keep in close touch 'vith his doctor for management of his chronic bronchitis and weight
problems."
Dr. Mortensen indicates, that because of bronchitis,
overweight and silicosis, Mr. Davies would be limited
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in his plty~i<'al a~tivitiP~ at least 30)'~ at that tin1e,
<·otnpurecl to a nor·n•altnan of his age. (R-128, 129).
~'lr.

Davil S r(•t urned to his regular occupation,
t·ont inuPd his regular dutiP~, at his regular salary until
the opt·rat ion "·as closed down because of the dust
hnzard, as of DPePill her 3/1 1960. (R-68) In November
and DPet'tnber of 1961, l\lr. Davies did work as a · con~ulting geologist, (R-~7) and received the sum of $500.00
for his \rork. (l{.-~8, -!9, 69, 70 and 71).
1

\\'"as ~lr. Davies totally disabled as a matter of law

in XoYelnber and December of 1961 ~ Section 35-2-12
UC1\ l~)~l~), defining terms, is of assistance here and
the portions covering ''total disability" and "partial
per1nanent disability" are set forth as follows:

"35-2-12. CONSTRUC'T ION OF TERMS. rrhe following terms as used in this act shall be
construed as follows:
" (a) 'Disablement' means the event of becoining physically incapacitated by reason of an
occupational disease as defined in this act from
performing any \Vork for remuneration or profit.
Silicosis, as defined in this act, when complicated
by active puhnonary tuberculosis, shall be presuined to be total disablenient. 'Disability,' 'disabled,' total disability,' or totally disabled' shall
be synonymous 'vith 'disablement,' but they shall
have no reference to 'partial permanent disabil-

·ty'•

1

" (e) 'Partial permanent disability,' as herein
used, is defined as that pathological condition directly resulting from -an occupational disease and
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causing substantial physical irnpairment, evidenced by objective medical and clinical findings
readily demonstrable, and which has reduced the
earning capacity of the employee, excluding,
however, total disability cases."
Applying the definitions to the facts of the instant
case, we believe that Mr. Davies was probably "partially
permanently disabled" during the period of NovemberDecember 1961, because there is "substantial physical
impairment" which has reduced the earning capacity
of the employee. However, as a Inatter of law, he was
not "totally disabled" at this time because he was
"performing work for remuneration or profit." Although
he was not performing labor in the sense of manual labor
requiring great physical exertion, it is "any work for
remuneration or profit," which is the test of the statute.
Had the commission determined Mr. Davies to be totally
disabled at this time, this court might well reverse the
commission as a matter of law.
Mr. Davies filed his application for disability on
April 9, 1962; within four months of the time he last
performed work for remuneraton or profit, to-wit, November-December of 1961.
When did Mr. Davies become totally disabled f It
was the opinion of the three member chest panel, appointed by the Industrial Commission and consisting of specialists Drs. Kilpatrick, Moffat and Waldo, that Mr.
Davies was totally disabled as of June 16, 1962. This
date is within two years from the last day upon which
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tht- einployt~e actually \Vorked for the e1nployer against
whorn t·otnpensation is clairned, to-,vit, December 31, 1960.

1r ndPr the facts of this case, it is difficult to see how
a findin~ of partial disability in l\Ir. Daves could be
:-;u:-;taitu·d prior to DPePHtber 31, 1960 under the provi:-;iuns or ;~~>-:2-1~ ( t'). Syn1ptornatically, he demonstrated
:-;ilieo~i~ yet there \Yas no reduction in his earning capacity prior to thi~ date.
This court is no doubt familiar with the cases wherein tht• e1nployee and the employer are both aware of the
~ilicotic condition developing in the employee. The
t'tnploype is then taken out of underground or. exposure
type employment and is placed in other employme~t
whPrein the e1nployee continues to work until disability
finally occurs. See Pacific Employers Insuranc-e. Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 108 Utah 123, 157. P 2d 800.;
Pacific Employers Insurance Company v. In£1u$triql
Conunissiou, 115 Utah 451, 205 P 2d 829. To apply the
reasoning of the plaintiffs to these situatio:q.s, an employee would be barred by a one year statute of limitation eonunencing at the time he knew he ·had silicosis,
regardless of the fact that he continues in gainful em'ployment and suffers no reduction in his e·arning capa~
city. The un\vorkability of such an approach iS:-.r~adily
apparent. The filing of a claiJ:n for disability due t9
silicosis results in a termination of employment.
•

J

·'

Defendants have no quarrel with the doctrines laid
do,vn in the cases of Jlarsh v. Industrial Accident Commiss iO'n, 217 Cal. 338, 18 P 2d ·933; or· St,ate I nsuranee
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Fund v. Industrial Commission, 116 Utah 279, 209 P 2d
553. The quoted portion of the latter case in the
plaintffs' brief is illustrative :
"The better rule which is in accord with
reason and justice, is that a cause of action does
not arise until an ascertainable disability and
compensable disability results."
(Emphasis
added.)
!The disability must be ascertainable and compensable, and there can be no compensation for total disability
when the employee is performing work for remuneration
or profit. Total disability is a mixed question of fact and
law. It cannot be subjectively determined by the employee. ·This determination is made by the Industrial
Commission based upon the Report of the Medical
Panel (R-19), as provided in 35-2-56 U·CA 1953, and on
other competent evidence contained in the record.
The Commission found that Mr. Davies performed
work for remuneration or profit in the capacity of a
consulting geologist and earned the sum of $500.00,
between November 15 and December 31, 1961. The commission also adopted the Medical Panel's finding that
employee was totally disabled as of June 15, 1962 (R-

153).
We submit that the application filed April 9, 1962
within four months of Mr. Davies' last work for remuneration or profit, is within time.
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CONCLUSION . ·
For t hP foregoing reasons, the Order of the Indus-~
trial Con1n1ission dated November 18, 1963, awarding-Mr.
Davies co1npensation for total disability should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted, ·
BRAYTON, LOWE & HURLEY
ANDRE.W R. HURLEY .
1001-5 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah - ·
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Received a copy of the foregoing Brief this·------~-------
day of July, 1964.
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